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Summary 
This article analyzes how Muslims are implied to constitute threats in the official Dan-
ish discourse of the centre-right government since 2001. It does so to provide a more 
nuanced picture of Danish debates on integration than the usual presentation of two 
discourses – culturalism and multiculturalism – pitted in opposition. By analytically 
focusing on “security narratives”, the article details how initial narratives of Muslims 
as threats to culture, welfare and societal peace merged and morphed to award surpris-
ing new roles to the state and multiculturalism. The re-evaluation of cultural difference 
implied in a recent strategy to counter radicalization, however, does not amount to a 
de-securitization of Muslims – rather it installs a need for surveillance and control of 
the Muslim difference. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Artikel analysiert die Darstellung von Muslimen als Bedrohung im Diskurs der 
dänischen Mitte-Rechts-Regierung seit 2001. Damit liefert er ein nuancierteres Bild 
der dänischen Integrationsdebatte, die üblicherweise als eine Gegenüberstellung zwei-
er gegenläufiger Diskurse – Kulturalismus und Multikulturalismus – beschrieben wird. 
Mittels einer analytischen Fokussierung auf „Sicherheitsnarrative“ zeigt der Artikel 
auf, auf welche Weise anfängliche Narrative von Muslimen als Bedrohung für Kultur, 
Wohlfahrt und gesellschaftlichen Frieden miteinander verschmolzen sind und sich da-
hingehend gewandelt haben, dass sie Staat und Multikulturalismus überraschend neue 
Rollen zuschreiben. Die Neubewertung von kultureller Differenz in einer jüngsten 
Strategie, die einer Radikalisierung entgegen wirken soll, hat keine Ent-
Versicherheitlichung der Muslime zur Folge – vielmehr festigt sie ein Bedürfnis nach 
Überwachung und Kontrolle des muslimischen Anderen. 
Ulrik Pram Gad, ph.d. is a post.doc. fellow at the Center for Advanced Security Theory at the Univer-
sity of Copenhagen. He obtained his doctoral degree in 2010, with a study on the way Muslims are 
othered in Danish identity discourse. Contact: upg@ifs.ku.dk. 
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If one reads a sufficiently broad selection of Danish debates – from marginal publica-
tions of the 1980s; via the letters to the editors of populist tabloid Ekstra-Bladet and 
conservative broad sheet Jyllands-Posten in the 1990s; to the nooks and corners of the 
internet in the new millennium – one may find strangers, aliens, immigrants, and Mus-
lims pointed out as threats to literally everything. It is, however, beyond doubt that two 
movements have made a difference.1 First, a considerable shift has taken place over 
the decades both concerning what one may say about “the strangers” and concerning 
who may – or must – say it. Animosity against strangers has moved from a marginal 
status to a position close to hegemony. This movement has taken place via the tabloid 
campaigns of Ekstra-Bladet in the mid-1990s2, via the foundation of the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) in 1995 and its election to parliament in 1998; via the 
dependency of the centre-right government on the votes of the Danish People’s Party 
for its parliamentary majority after 2001; and via the adaption of the Social Democrats 
and the Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) to the rhetoric of the new 
alien policy3. Second, animosity against strangers has condensed around religious dif-
ferences. It is no longer “strangers”, “aliens”, or “refugees and immigrants” who are 
pointed out as the problem: it is the Muslims.4 To the extent that the older concepts – 




1  This text has been discussed in a series of fora. I am especially indebted to my colleagues in 
the Danish politological EU studies PhD network, in the Department of Political Science 
Schæffergård seminars and the Center for Advanced Security Theory, both at University of 
Copenhagen – as well as to Peter Gundelach, Lis Højgaard, Christian Fogh Rostbøll, Signe 
Kjær Jørgensen, Mikkel Rytter and Marianne Holm Pedersen. 
2  Hervik, Peter: Den generende forskellighed. København 1999.
3  Jacobsen, Lotte et al.: Menneskesyn i flygtninge/indvandrerdebatten – en kritisk diskursana-
lyse af den politiske debat 1995–2006. Roskilde 2007.
4  Jacobsen, Brian A.: Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. København 2008, 234 and 
267f.; Tobiassen, Mette: “Danskernes verden var den samme efter 11. september”. In: Jørgen 
Goul Andersen and Ole Borre (eds.): Politisk forandring. Århus 2003, 361; Mouritsen, Per: 
“The particular universalism of a Nordic civic nation”. In: Tariq Modood et al. (eds.): Multi-
culturalism, Muslims and citizenship. New York 2006, 75f., 83, 88; Haldrup, Michael et al.: 
“Practical Orientalism”. In: Geografiska Annaler 88B (2006:2), 174, 183; Thomsen, Jens 
P. F: Konflikten om de nye danskere. København 2006, 188; Simonsen, Jørgen B.: Islam med 
danske øjne. 2  revised edition.nd  København 2006 [2004], 8, 14, 173ff.; Hauge, Hans: Post-
Danmark. København 2003, 54; Fenger-Grøn, Carsten and Malene Grøndahl: Flygtningenes 
danmarkshistorie 1954–2004. Århus 2004, 15, 179, 208f.
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have a semantic density around “Muslims”.5 In this regard, 9/11 and the falling twin 
towers have served as a symbol for this alignment. Furthermore, religion, integration, 
and counterterrorism have been linked across the distinction between domestic and 
foreign policy by, first, the bombings on the London underground on July 7th, 2005 
and the related concept of “home grown terrorists”, and second, the Cartoon crisis fol-
lowing the publication of twelve drawings commissioned by a Danish newspaper to 
portray the prophet Mohammed and the related concepts of “culture struggle” and 
“value struggle”. 
The current Danish debates on integration are often presented as a confrontation be-
tween two discourses: culturalism and multiculturalism.6 The two discourses – so the 
story goes – agree that culture is of defining importance for the individual, but they 
disagree over the relative value of cultures, at least when the cultures find themselves 
in Denmark: where multiculturalism ideally seeks equality between all cultures, in-
digenous or migrant, culturalism prioritizes Danish culture. Empirically it is, however, 
very difficult to find a consistent voice for full-blown multiculturalism.7 Obviously, 
there are sufficient recognizable tropes for culturalists to (re-)construct this favourite 
opponent of theirs – but it is equally possible to reconstruct the purportedly “multicul-
turalist” positions as a version of “repressive tolerance” towards the differences of the 
“other” while waiting for the “other” to self-assimilate into “our” (universally prefer-
able) way of life: The capacity for change of the “other” is frequently stressed – as is 
the lack of causal influence of “their” presence on “us” (at least when speaking about 




5  Andreassen, Rikke: Gender, Race, Sexuality and Nationality. Toronto 2005, 256ff.; Has-
trup, Kirsten: Kultur. Det fleksible fællesskab. Århus 2004, 105; Ardener, Erwin and Mal-
colm Chapman (eds.): The Voice of Prophecy and other essays. Oxford 1989, 169.
6  Stjernfeldt, Frederik and Jens-Martin Eriksen: Adskillelsens politik. Multikulturalisme – 
ideologi og virkelighed. København 2008.
7  In contrast to what Stjernfeldt and Eriksen (ibid.) claim, Holm – based on analysis of par-
liamentary debates – notes that “the idea that integration should take place by awarding 
group rights to refugees and immigrants at no point challenged the dominant concept of 
integration which was primarily oriented to the individual”. (“at forestillingen om, at inte-
gration skulle ske gennem tildeling af grupperettigheder til flygtninge og indvandrere, på 
intet tidspunkt truede den dominerende opfattelse af integration, som overvejende indi-
vidorienteret”) Holm, Lærke: Folketinget og Udlændingepolitikken – diskurser om natu-
raliserede, indvandrere og flygtninge 1973–2002. Ålborg 2007, 214.
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notion of multiculturalism alive: first, multiculturalism has become a label for any ex-
plicitly articulated opposition to culturalism (the opposition amounting to a rather inef-
ficient attempt at a counter-hegemonic project). Second, the perfectly symbiotic rela-
tion which ideal type multiculturalism has with culturalism as its official opponent: by 
agreeing to disagree on premises which systematically make it lose every debate, mul-
ticulturalism has served culturalism well.8
This article claims that the representation of the Danish identity political landscape in 
terms of the two camps of culturalism and multiculturalism is too simple. Primarily, a 
more nuanced picture of the narratives told by the government is necessary. Between 
the self-reproducing symbiosis of the discourses of culturalism and multiculturalism, 
two governments – first, one under Socialdemocratic leadership; now, one headed by 
the Liberal party – have tried to carve out the room for an alternative policy of integra-
tion by talking as little as possible about culture. Talking “as little as possible” about 
culture has, however, gradually turned into “a lot”. In this article I analyze how Mus-
lims are implied to constitute threats in the official Danish discourse of the centre-right 
government since 2001. The analysis, hence, does not focus on the narratives promoted 
by the decidedly culturalist Danish People’s Party (DPP). Instead, it focuses on those pro-
moted by the government – who, on the one hand, explicitly distances itself from the 
DPP at times, while on the other hand attempting to avoid alienating the party which 
grants that government its parliamentary majority. Beginning the analysis in 2001 is an 




8  Wren and Hervik find culturalism to be dominant in Danish media and popular discourse 
(See Wren, Karen: “Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark”. In: Social 
& Cultural Geography 2 (2001:2), 141–162; Hervik, Peter: “The Danish Cultural World 
of Unbridgeable Differences”. In: Ethnos 69 (2004:2), 247–267). Hedetoft and Emerek – 
relatedly – find that “integration” in official Danish discourse includes a substantial meas-
ure of cultural assimilation (See Hedetoft, Ulf: “More Than Kin and Less Than Kind: The 
Danish Politics of Ethnic Consensus and the Pluricultural Challenge”. In John L. Camp-
bell et al. (eds.): National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism. The Danish Experience. 
Montreal et al. 2006, 398–429, here: 419f.; Idem: Multiculturalism in Denmark and Swe-
den. Copenhagen 2006 (= Danish Institute of International Studies, DIIS Brief; December 
2006)) (Emerek, Ruth: Integration – eller inklusion? Den danske diskussion om integrati-
on. Aalborg 2003 (= AMID Working Paper; 31)). Haldrup et al. (Haldrup 2006, as foot-
note 4) find culturalist popular discourse to be mutually constitutive with a number of eve-
ryday practices of othering Muslims which they label “practical orientalism”.
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tre-left to centre-right. However, this change of government should not be given too 
much weight: the incoming government developed and implemented a series of ideas 
initiated by the former government.9  
More specifically, the article reads the government statements on integration of refugees 
and migrants and on how to counter terrorism as narratives about “us” and “them”. More 
specifically, the article reads these statements as “security narratives” about what “we” 
need to do to “them” to protect “us” from “them”. As a concept, a “security narrative” 
may be characterized in three ways. First, it presents an “us” in relation to a “they”. Sec-
ond, “they” are presented as threatening. Third, the narrative involves the passage of time 
and a (potential) change in this relationship during this passing of time. What is crucial is 
that the text analyzed describes a threat to something valued and a means of averting this 
threat. This will generally imply a temporalization as part of the argument for why what 
is described as threatening is threatening or for why what is described as threatened is 
worth to br protected. In principle, this concept allows – when employed as an analytics – 
anything to be perceived as threatening towards anything else. However, the specific 
analysis in this article is concentrated on threats which are described as, first, originating 




9  Not least of which were ideas fostered by the so-called “Think Tank on challenges to the 
integration effort in Denmark”. The reports of this “think tank” play, as will become clear 
from the analysis below, a central role in the official Danish narratives.
10  The theoretical and methodological framework for this analysis fuses two lines of thought 
in the study of International Relations: First, Wæver’s theory of “securitization” including 
Huysmans’ critique of the theory in relation to the securitization of migration (See Wæver, 
Ole: “Societal security: the concept”. In: Idem et al.: Identity, Migration and the New Se-
curity Agenda in Europe. London 1993; Buzan, Barry et al.: Securitization. A New Fra-
mework for Analysis. Boulder 1998; Huysmans, Jef: The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Mig-
ration, and Asylum in the EU. London 2006). Second, a tradition for studying foreign 
policy as the production of identity and difference (See Neumann, Iver B.: Uses of the 
Other – ‘the East’ in European identity formation. Manchester 1999; Hansen, Lene: Secu-
rity as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London 2006; Rumelili, Bahar: 
Construction Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia. Houndsmill 
2007) combined with narrative theory (Ricœur, Paul: Time and Narrative. Vol. 3. Chicago 
1988). A more detailed discussion of the theoretical and methodological framework is 
available in Gad, Ulrik Pram: (How) Can They Become Us? Ph.D. Diss. Copenhagen 
2010.
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The analysis asks what exactly it is that must be defended from the Muslims – and 
what answers to the threats are prescribed by the government.11 The first group of an-
swers are narratives of “integration”: Muslims need to be integrated into Danish soci-
ety. What does that mean? How is it a threat to Danish society that there is a group of 
people which are not integrated in it? Why? A second group of answers start out as 
narratives of the prevention of terrorism – but end up speaking about the integration of 
Muslims, too. 
In his opening speech to parliament immediately after the inauguration of the new 
government in 2001, the prime minister puts three threats into play: the threat to socie-
tal peace, the threat to welfare society, and the threat to cultural identity.12
It is an important investment in the future to have Danish alien policy back in order. For 
years a lax alien policy has been conducted – a policy which is now putting the Danish 
society under pressure. It is a problem that half the immigrants in Denmark are out of 
job. And it is a problem that there are groups of young second generation immigrants 
who are strained by serious crime. A number of them are rejecting the values on which 
the Danish society is built. And they reject integration into the Danish society. We have 
to realize these facts. We have to tighten our alien policy. Otherwise a growing opposi-
tion will evolve between the population groups in the Danish society. Being a peaceful 
and harmonic people is emblematic to Denmark. That is the way it should be in the fu-
ture too. It is not so that we shall be identical all of us. Of course not. There has to be 
freedom to differ. But we have to build a strong society where there is a community 





11  As it will become clear from the analysis, the question whether the threats are “Muslim” is 
the subject of a political struggle. It is, hence, an analytical claim that the result of these 
struggles, so far, is that the threats are described as “Muslim”. This claim is backed up by 
recent research (cf. footnote 8) – but when push comes to shove, it is up to the reader to 
decide whether s/he is convinced by the analytical narrative presented in the following. 
12  These are basically the same three threats identified by Huysmans in an analysis of the 
securitization of migration and asylum in the EU (Huysmans 2006, as footnote 10).
13  “Det er en vigtig investering i fremtiden, at vi får bragt orden i dansk udlændingepolitik. I 
flere år er der ført en slap udlændingepolitik, som nu sætter det danske samfund under 
pres. Det er et problem, at halvdelen af indvandrerne i Danmark er uden arbejde. Og det er 
et problem, at der er grupper af unge anden generations indvandrere, som er belastet af al-
vorlig kriminalitet. Flere af dem forkaster de værdier, det danske samfund bygger på. Og 
de nægter integration i det danske samfund. Vi er nødt til at se disse kendsgerninger i 
øjnene. Vi er nødt til at stramme udlændingepolitikken. Ellers vil der udvikle sig et vok-
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So Danish welfare is threatened by the low employment rate of the immigrants; Dan-
ish societal peace is threatened by their crime; and Danish values are threatened by 
rejection of these values. The three threats are presented as connected – but the spe-
cific connections are unclear: What group of “them” of whom “a number” reject the 
Danish values – is it only the criminal second generation immigrants, or does this 
group include the unemployed? In what direction is the causality: is it a job that leads 
to Danish values or is it the other way around? What is most important? What exactly 
is it which will destroy peaceful society? 
In the following years a series of distinct integration narratives have appeared in 
government policy papers and the interventions of cabinet ministers in parliament, in 
the press, and in public appearances. Each of the narratives describes a relationship 
between the good which is threatened, the source of the threat, and the necessary 
counter-measures. In that way, each narrative leaves a more or less distinct set of roles 
which must be taken up by foreigners as a part of their integration. The threat to peace 
is narrated in three ways: first, there are two parallel narratives which focus on the 
criminal second generation immigrant and on the intruding terrorist – these are the fo-
cus of the first section of the article. A third narrative constructs the threat as “home 
grown”. To account for the shift from intrusion to “home grown”, the article needs to 
focus on two other threats and the narratives told about them: because in between are a 
series of attempts to tell stories that articulate the threat to welfare and the threat to 
culture. The second section of the article recounts a succession of stories discussing 
the threats to culture and welfare and, more specifically, labour market integration and 
cultural assimilation, which are supposed to ameliorate these threats. The third section 
zooms out to address two grand narratives which support the demand for cultural as-
similation. The fourth section lays out how these central integration narratives on cul-




sende modsætningsforhold mellem befolkningsgrupperne i det danske samfund. Danmark 
er kendetegnet ved at være et fredeligt og harmonisk folk. Sådan skal det også være i 
fremtiden. Ikke sådan at vi alle skal være ens. Naturligvis ikke. Der skal være frihed til 
forskellighed. Men vi skal bygge et stærkt samfund, hvor der et fællesskab om nogle 
grundlæggende værdier og holdninger.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a parliamentary deba-
te on the resolution on Danish military participation in the international efforts against ter-
ror networks in Afghanistan, Copenhagen, 14th December 2001, http://webarkiv.ft.dk/ 
Samling/20012/beslutningsforslag_som_vedtaget/B37.htm, 11  November 2009.th
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with the narrative of the threat from “the home grown terrorist”. A concluding section 
considers how Danish identity narratives may end up producing Muslim counter-
narratives which can only be accounted for as threats in the terms of the selfsame Dan-
ish identity narratives. 
The first threat to societal peace: intrusion 
The narrative of crime as a threat to peace plays a minor role in the first initiatives of 
the new government – in the field of integration.14 Instead, the matter is treated as an 
integrated part of a more general reform of the penal code. The threat is to be averted 
by adjusting the incitement structures facing the individual – primarily negatively in 
the form of more severe punishment, but also positively in the form of supplying alter-
native possibilities.15 The only initiative which is targeted directly at the ethnic back-
ground of the criminal is the possibility of revoking the residence permit of non-
citizens.16 Even if the connection forged by the prime minister between crime and the 
rejection of Danish values is not explicitly present in policy papers and legislative ini-
tiatives in the field of integration, the connection is re-established in various parlia-
mentary debates: the crime rate is a consequence of values which have migrated to the 




14  Mentioned in a subordinate clause in: Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration: På 
vej mod en ny integrationspolitik. 2002, 16. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/resources.ashx/Resour-
ces/Publikationer/Regeringsinitiativer/2002/ny_integrationspolitik.pdf, 3  November 2009rd .
15  Cf. ibid.
16  “Udlændingepolitik”. In: Regeringsgrundlag 2001. Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse. 2001. 
http://www.stm.dk/publikationer/regeringsgrundlag/reggrund01.htm#udl%C3%A6ndingepolitik, 
3  November 2009rd ; En ny udlændingepolitik. 2002. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdon-
lyres/442728D5-C3FA-4CD8-8557-7350ECD53745/0/en_ny_udlaendingepolitik.pdf, 
3  November 2009rd ; Nye Mål. Regeringsgrundlag. 2005. http://www.stm.dk/publikatio-
ner/reggrund05/nye_%20maal_web.pdf, 30  March 2007th .
17  Even when the parliamentary debate is occasioned by a survey documenting that members 
of ethnic minorities dissociate themselves from a series of specific crimes by a larger pro-
portion than ethnic Danes. Cf. “1  reading of F37”st  (Parliamentary debate on fundamental 
values and norms in Denmark, 26  April 2007). th http://www.ft.dk/doc.aspx?/Sam-
ling/20061/salen/F37_BEH1_83_1_(NB).htm, 2  May 2008.nd
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tions which qualify as extraordinary no matter what yardstick we may apply.18 At first, 
however, the threat is not directly aimed at Denmark: 
When we engage ourselves in the solution of the problems of the world, it is, i.a., be-




18  To the DPP, the two threats to societal peace are the same, as Muslim crime is a small sca-
le form of Islamic terror. “[T]he effort to be made against terror must not only be targeted 
at the persons already caught by terror networks but has to attempt to forestall such things 
from happening at all. In this context it is important to severely crack down on criminal, 
young immigrants moving in circles where crime and Islamic fundamentalism are mixed. 
It is well known that for example the Hizb-ut-Tahrir is recruiting young Muslims on the 
street level, often young Muslims offending against the law. […] Terrorism may be defi-
ned in different ways. One definition is that terrorism is characterized by violence and 
speculation in fear being used to further a political opinion or a political aim. Another de-
finition is that terror is crime threatening, undermining or outright destroying the political, 
economic, or social structures of a country. The riots we have seen in Paris are frightening; 
it might not be terror but it is frightening. It is not terror in the original meaning of the 
word but it is nonetheless mob rule, which is embryonic terror. The unrest in Rosenhøj 
near Århus is, of course, of an altogether different scale, but these problems too are caused 
by the lack of respect for authorities and for the society which the immigrants ought to be 
part of. It is the lack of respect for the authorities which sows the seeds of terror.” 
(“[I]ndsatsen mod terror [skal] ikke alene [...] rette sig mod de personer, som allerede er 
blevet indfanget af terrornetværk, men også skal forsøge at foregribe, at noget lignende 
overhovedet sker. I den forbindelse er det vigtigt at slå hårdt ned på kriminelle, unge ind-
vandrere, der færdes i et miljø, hvor kriminalitet og islamisk fundamentalisme sam-
menblandes. Det er velkendt, at Hizb-ut-Tahrir eksempelvis hverver unge muslimer på ga-
deplan, ofte unge muslimer, der er på kant med loven. [...] Terrorisme kan defineres på 
forskellig måde. Én definition er, at terrorisme er karakteriseret ved, at vold og spekulation 
i frygt bruges til at fremme et politisk synspunkt eller et politisk mål. En anden definition 
er, at terror er forbrydelser, der truer, underminerer eller ligefrem ødelægger landenes poli-
tiske, økonomiske og sociale strukturer. De optøjer, vi har set i Paris, er skræmmende, det 
er måske ikke terror, men det er skræmmende. Der er ikke tale om terror i ordets egent-
ligste forstand, men det er i hvert fald et pøbelvælde, som indeholder kimen til terror. Uro-
lighederne i Rosenhøj ved Århus er naturligvis i en helt anden målestok, men også disse 
problemer skyldes, at man ingen respekt har for autoriteter og heller ikke for det samfund, 
som indvandrerne burde være en del af. Det er mangelen på respekt for autoriteterne, der 
øger kimen til terror.”) MP Skaarup, Peter in: “1  reading of F7”st  (Parliamentary debate on 
the measures to counter terrorist activities in Denmark). 13  November 2005. th
http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/forespoergsel/f7/beh1/forhandling.htm, 2  June 2010.nd
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we have shown solidarity with the USA and other countries in the international fight a-
gainst terrorism.19
The countermeasures presented are, first, fighting terrorism with military means “out 
in the world” together with the USA;20 second, to make sure that terrorists do not get 
inside Denmark;21 third, to keep them under surveillance, to catch and to prosecute 
them if they do anyway.22 Quite soon, however, the narrative on the terrorist threat 
changes so that the object of the threat is more clearly “us”. The government explicitly 
points out terrorism as the threat taking over from the existential threat of the Cold 
War: 
The threats of the 21  century are fundamentally different from the ones we faced du-
ring the Cold War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is no 
longer an all-destructive nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global ter-
ror networks or desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the internatio-







19  “Når vi engagerer os i løsningen af denne verdens problemer, så er det jo blandt andet, fordi vi 
har nogle grundlæggende værdier om ret og rimeligt. [...] Derfor har vi vist solidaritet med 
USA og andre lande i den internationale kamp mod terrorisme.” PM Rasmussen, Anders 
Fogh: “PM’s inaugural speech”. 4  December 2001. th http://www.statsministeriet.dk/ 
_p_7327.html, 3  November 2009rd .
20  Folketinget: “B37” (Resolution on Danish military participation in the international efforts 
against terror networks in Afghanistan). 14  December 2001th . http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Sam-
ling/20012/beslutningsforslag_som_vedtaget/B37.htm, 11  November 2009.th
21  Haarder, Bertel: “L32” (Act on revision of the Alien law to counter terrorism). 13  December 
2001.
th
 Written presentation by Minister for Integration, http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling 
/20012/lovforslag_fremsaettelse/L32.htm, 11  November 2009.th
22  At first, by passing new anti-terror legislation (Folketinget: “L35”. (Anti-terror legislation) as 
passed by parliament, 31  May 2002.st  http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20012/lovfors-
lag_som_vedtaget/L35.htm, 11  November 2009th ).
23  “Det 21. århundredes trusler er fundamentalt anderledes, end dem vi stod overfor under 
Den Kolde Krig og de første år efter Murens fald. Mareridtet er ikke længere den altø-
delæggende atomkrig, men massivt ødelæggende angreb fra globale terrornetværk eller 
desperate regimer, der har stillet sig uden for det internationale samfund. Terrorisme er i 
dag en virkelig og væsentlig trussel mod befolkningerne overalt i verden.” Regeringen: En 
verden i forandring. 2003, 2. http://www.um.dk/da/servicemenu/Publikationer/Uden-
rigspolitik/EnVerdenIForandring.htm, 22  September 2008nd .
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These initial narratives on both crime and terror may be summed up as the argument 
that “they” come from outside with values allowing or inducing “them” to commit 
crime and terror. Therefore, “they” threaten “our” societal peace. Therefore, “we” must 
stop “them” from intruding and make it harder for those who nevertheless get inside to 
follow “their” values. At the same time, it is important for the government to make 
clear that the threat does not emanate from Islam or Muslims as such: 
Some in Denmark were swift to declare war on the large part of humanity which profes-
ses more or less to the world religion of Islam. We have, of course, to distance ourselves 
from such generalizations and such suspicions. Individual Muslims in Denmark should 
not suffer from this. Terrorism shall not be answered with new persecution of more na-
tions. It is the criminals who shall be hunted down with every means compatible with 
our conception of justice.24
After the bombing of the London underground in 2005 and the Cartoon crisis in 2006, 
this dissociation is placed in a new light by the concept of “home grown terrorists” and 
by the linking of local and global threats to constitute a single “value struggle”. By 
then, the threat is aimed at “us-Denmark” and not just at the more non-committing 
“us-who-share-values” and “us-the-populations-everywhere-in-the-world”. We will 
return to this below. 
Culture or welfare: What comes first? 
First, however, we need to chart the central debate on Danish integration policy. This 
central debate pertains to the importance of labour market integration relative to cul-
tural assimilation. What is it that needs to be protected: welfare or culture? If both, 




24  “For nogle i Danmark gik det meget hurtigt med at erklære krig mod den store del af men-
neskeheden, der i større eller mindre grad bekender sig til verdensreligionen islam. Den 
generalisering og mistænkeliggørelse skal vi naturligvis tage afstand fra. Det skal ikke gå 
ud over de enkelte muslimer i Danmark. Terrorisme skal ikke besvares med ny forfølgelse 
af flere folkeslag. Det er forbryderne, der skal jagtes med alle de midler, der er forenelige 
med vort retssyn.” Hornbech, Birthe Rønn in: “1 reading of L35” st (Parliamentary debate 
on anti-terror legislation). 31  January 2002st . http://webarkiv.ft.dk/?/samling/20012/sa-
len/l35_beh1_23_4_45.htm, 9  November 2009.th
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What is the threat to culture: Their culture or multiculturalism? 
It is well known that the DPP, which supports the government in parliament every now 
and then, point out Islam, Muslim culture in the abstract or specific “Muslim” prac-
tices as threats to Danish culture among a series of other objects.25 This threat con-
struction forms the background for the phrasing repeated time and again by the first 
minister for integration in the centre-right government: “I have repeatedly said that I 
am not minister for shower curtains, veils and [pork] liver pâté in kindergardens.”26 
The words served as an explanation for why he would not take action against Muslim 
cultural traits said to threaten this or that practice implied to be emblematic for Danish 
culture.  
It is clear that the threat constructed by the DPP does not serve as the point of depar-
ture for the official narrative of Danish integration policy. But that does not imply that 
there is no threat to avert. The threat described by the government is aimed at the func-
tion of Danish culture as that which sets the rules of the game on Danish soil: 
Danish culture is more important than other cultures. When I as a minister for education 
put the biblical narrative centre stage in religious instruction [literally: Christian studies] 
it was clearly an act of discrimination. One needs to be familiar with the biblical story, 
and one needs to be acquainted with other religions. This is discrimination and this is 
the way it should be. The same way in Danish lessons; there one reads Danish literature 
– it is more important than foreign literature. So, I contend, all this talk of equality of 
cultures and equality of religion – it is nonsense ... Well, Denmark is a Danish society. It 
is the Danes who decide in Denmark. And we are, as well, the ones who decide how 





25  Cf. Jacobsen 2008, as footnote 4, 267f. 
26  “Jeg har gentagne gange sagt, at jeg ikke er minister for badeforhæng og tørklæder og le-
verpostej i børnehaver.” Haarder, Bertel: “US131”. Answer by the Minister for Integration, 
11  May 2004.th  http://webarkiv.ft.dk/doc.aspx?/samling/arkiv.htm, 9  November 2009.th
27  “Dansk kultur er vigtigere end andre kulturer. Da jeg som undervisningsminister satte den 
bibelske fortælling i centrum af kristendomsundervisningen, så var det klar diskriminati-
on. Man skal være fortrolig med den bibelske fortælling, og man skal have kendskab til 
andre religioner. Det er diskrimination, og sådan skal det være. Tilsvarende i dansktimer-
ne. Der læser man dansk litteratur – det er vigtigere end udenlandsk litteratur. Derfor siger 
jeg, at al den tale om kulturlighed og religionslighed – det er nonsens. [...] Danmark er nu 
engang et dansk samfund. Det er danskerne, der bestemmer i Danmark. Det er også os, der 
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In this way the source of the threat is formally displaced from specific Muslims and 
Islam as such to the acceptance and protection of minority cultures promoted by an 
abstract multiculturalism.28 After this displacement the threat at first stems – rather 
than from Muslims – from a multiculturalist ideal of treating every cultural practice 
equally. The very point of this intervention of the Minister for Integration is to present 
discrimination as something non-extraordinary, as a normal course of action. In that 
sense the pointing out of multiculturalism as a threat serves to constitute “Danish cul-
ture” as the normalized framework for political community. 
It is not just multiculturalism and the way it places cultures on equal footing which 
constitutes the threat. Because the concept of culture implied is binary29 in the sense that 
culture is an either/or question, culture comes as a package deal: you either take it or lea-
ve it. So when the minister retells the perfect integration narrative, it goes like this: 
The Chinese are perfect immigrants because they fulfil the only criteria for integration: 
integration in the labour market. It is an entrepreneurial culture where one has to contri-
bute before one may consume. And there is no one demanding that they dispose of their 
culture as long as they prove themselves able to work and participate in the Danish 
community ... If all immigrants were like the Chinese, my job as Minister for Integrati-
on would be deeply superfluous.30
The point of establishing this ideal is that not all immigrants are like the Chinese. Not 
all migrants have the Chinese culture which – according to the Minister – does not bar 




bestemmer, hvor mange der skal lukkes ind. Er det ikke diskrimination? Jo, selvfølgelig er 
det diskrimination.” Hardis, Arne: ”Selvfølgelig er det diskrimination”. Interview with 
Bertel Haarder, Minister of Integration. In: Weekendavisen, 1  March 2002st , 3.
28  This threat may, of course, also be found in DPP narratives.
29  Eriksen, Thomas Hylland: “Murer og identiteter – Noen formelle trekk ved åpenhet og 
lukkethet”. In: Ole Tunander (ed.): Europa och Muren. Om ‘den andre’, gränslandet och 
historiens återkomst i 90-talets Europa. Ålborg 1995, 115–126.
30  “Kineserne er perfekte indvandrere, fordi de opfylder det eneste krav til integration: 
integration på arbejdsmarkedet. Det er en iværksætterkultur, hvor man skal yde, før man 
kan nyde. Og der er ingen, der siger, at de skal afskaffe deres kultur, når bare de kan finde 
ud af at arbejde og deltage i det danske samfund [...] Hvis alle indvandrere var som kine-
sere, ville mit job som integrationsminister være inderligt overflødigt”. Bertel Haarder 
quoted from Surrugue, Stephanie and Tanja P. Astrup: “Nej, vi er ikke godt integrerede”. 
In: Politiken. 9  February 2002th , 3/3.
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narrative about the connection between the threat to Danish culture and the threat to 
Danish welfare. Such a narrative comes in a series of versions. At first, welfare comes 
out on top – later, things gradually get more complicated. 
The state – and culturalism – as threats to welfare  
In the first formulations of the integration policy of the new government, focus is un-
ambiguously on the labour market: “To the government there is no doubt that a job is 
the key to successful integration.”31 This “rationalist” narrative points out the low pro-
portion of aliens with jobs as a threat to the way the welfare society is financed and to 
its ability to compete in the world market. In this narrative, a citizen able to provide for 
himself is a well-integrated citizen. The low proportion of immigrants active in the 
labour market is a threat to Danish welfare:32
If we satisfactorily accomplish the task [of integration] it will increase employment and 
reduce public spending on social security. If we do not succeed we will have an increa-
sed pressure on the economy of the welfare society while we at the same time risk a so-
ciety with labour shortage.33
Notably, in this narrative the welfare society and the immigrant are in the same boat, 




31  “For regeringen hersker der ingen tvivl om, at et arbejde er nøglen til succesfuld integration.” 
Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2002, as footnote 14, 1. Even when the 
text does not present labour market integration as exhausting the concept of integration, it is 
not culture but political participation which is the necessary supplement: “A job is an impor-
tant road to integration, but it does not do the trick on its own. Integration is also about being 
able to participate in others parts of societal life, so that the individual new citizen may enter 
into work in civil society associations and school boards.” (Cf. ibid.).
32  Welfare is not just a technical way of ordering things – it is a central element in the identity of 
the Danish nation state: the solidary Danish people have built for themselves a welfare soci-
ety to nest the unfolding of their inner qualities (Hansen, Lene: “Sustaining sovereignty: the 
Danish approach to Europe”. In: Idem and Ole Wæver (eds.): European Integration and Nati-
onal Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States. London 2002, 51f., 60f., 69, 80ff.).
33  “Løser vi [integrations]opgaven tilfredsstillende, vil det øge beskæftigelsen og nedbringe de 
offentlige sociale udgifter. Lykkes det ikke, får vi et samfund med et voksende pres på 
velfærdssamfundets økonomi, samtidig med at vi risikerer et samfund med mangel på ar-
bejdskraft.” Indenrigsministeriet: Udlændinges integration i det danske samfund. Tænketan-
ken om udfordringer for integrationsindsatsen i Danmark. København 2001, section 2.2.
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In Denmark all citizens must have equal access to work life and societal life – including 
our new citizens who have come here as refugees and immigrants. [...] Today an all too 
large share of our new citizens are outside the labour market. If the affiliation to the la-
bour market of the new citizens was the same as that of the rest of the population, 
60 000 more persons would be in jobs.34
In this “rationalist” version of the narrative, the threat comes from the exclusion of 
immigrants – and the source of the threat is not the one excluded but someone else 
doing something to the excluded. This “rationalist” narrative is also the first govern-
ment narrative about the connection between cultural integration and labour market 
integration. It begins when “[t]he vast majority of new citizens arrive in the country 
wanting to contribute an effort to create a new life for him or herself in Denmark.”35
The common threat to Danish welfare and the new citizens comes from the “clientifica-
tion” performed by the welfare state on these new citizens.36 The countermeasures pro-
posed are, first, the deconstruction of harmful bureaucracy, and, second, a reconstruction 
of the incitement structures greeting the new arrival. The point of both is to get the im-
migrant (or his or her children) in a job as soon as possible.37 The obvious way to fit 
culture and religion into this narrative is awarding it the role of an irrational distraction: 
It is remarkable that employers who have experienced new-Danish apprentices quickly 
forget about the cultural background of the apprentices. In the humdrum of everyday li-




34  “I Danmark skal alle borgere have adgang til arbejds- og samfundslivet – også vores nye 
borgere, der er kommet hertil som flygtninge og indvandrere. [...] I dag står en alt for stor 
andel af vore nye borgere uden for arbejdsmarkedet. Hvis de nye borgeres tilknytning til 
arbejdsmarkedet var den samme som den øvrige del af befolkningens, ville der være 
60 000 flere personer i arbejde.” Ibid.
35  “Langt de fleste nye borgere kommer til landet med ønsket om at yde en indsats for at 
skabe sig en ny tilværelse i Danmark.” Ibid., 2.
36  “klientgørelse” Ibid.
37  Cf. ibid., 2ff.
38  “Det er jo bemærkelsesværdigt, at de arbejdsgivere, der har erfaring med nydanske elever 
meget hurtigt ‘glemmer’ elevernes kulturelle baggrund. I den grå hverdag er det ikke kultur, 
men faglighed og social kunnen, der er vigtig.” Frederiksen, Claus Hjort (Minister of Labour, 
Venstre): “Hvordan får vi flere små og mellemstore virksomheder til at ansætte nydanskere?”. 
Speech at conference 23  April 2002.rd  http://gammel.bm.dk/sw8499.asp, 9  November 2009.th
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Therefore it is about making space and room for everyone, disregarding the colour of 
skin and foreign-sounding names. One of the problems is the massive focus on religion, 
culture and tradition.39
A misguided focus on cultural difference – culturalism – is a threat, albeit a minor one 
compared to clientification. This second threat should be countered by everybody tak-
ing up a more relaxed approach to cultural differences and by more interaction across 
cultural differences. However, a narrative involving such an outspoken hostility to cul-
turalism is not viable in the long run, when one is simultaneously attempting to articu-
late a narrative awarding Danish culture the double position as that which is threatened 
and in itself an important countermeasure to the threat.40
One way of making ends meet is the paperclip method: listing the two aims of integra-
tion. What is decisive is labour market integration – but there is also this other threat 
that can only be countered by another kind of integration. This kind is expressed by 
statements such as the following: 
In our opinion it is the following social conditions which are decisive for whether we 
may speak of a successful integration: Education, employment, and self-sufficience. [...] 
One of the goals of a successful integration is that foreigners endorse some of the fun-
damental values and norms of Denmark.41
According to these “paper clip” texts, the process of “integration” should avert threats 
to both welfare and values without explaining how the two are related. No narrative 




39  “Derfor handler det om at skabe plads og rum til alle, uanset hudfarve og fremmedklingende 
navn. Et af problemerne er den massive fokus på religion, kultur og tradition.” Idem: Speech 
at presentation of Sønderborg’s and Løgumkloster’s Equal-project, 10  April 2002. th
http://gammel.bm.dk/sw8502.asp, 9  November 2009.th
40  The new government is, as mentioned, specifically dependent on the articulation of this 
narrative as it is dependent on forming a majority in parliament with the DPP. The preced-
ing government attempted – in a more tentative way – to articulate this narrative through 
its resonance with the electorate.
41  “det er efter vores opfattelse følgende sociale forhold, der er afgørende for, at man kan tale 
om en vellykket integration: Uddannelse, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse [...] Et af måle-
ne for en vellykket integration er, at udlændinge tilslutter sig og efterlever nogle 
grundlæggende værdier og normer i Danmark.” Indenrigsministeriet 2001, as footnote 33, 
sections 2.4; 2.11.
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by listing. Another version relates the two types of integration causally so that labour 
market integration will in the end lead the immigrant to learn Danish values.  
Relating culture and welfare by letting welfare lead to culture 
Over time, however, a narrative surfaces which constructs a causality in the opposite 
direction: Labour market integration is still the central aim – but to reach the aim, cul-
tural integration is needed. At least certain central culturally and religiously based val-
ues, norms, and practices must be left behind as they exclude competing Danish val-
ues, norms, and practices.42 The government’s “Think tank on challenges to the 
integration effort” explicitly explains the shift to this new narrative in a report: 
In the first report of the think tank, the endorsement of fundamental values and norms 
was not emphasized as one of the most important goals for a successful integration a par 
with education, employment and self-supportance. The experiences and inquiries obtai-
ned since 2001 seem, however, to indicate that values and norms should be ascribed a 
larger significance [...] The point that foreigners should endorse fundamental values and 
norms does not in itself mean that foreigners have to give up their original culture, e. g. 
religion, attire, or cuisine. This may, however, be necessary if insistence on the original 
culture is in conflict with values and norms in Denmark to such an extent that foreigners 




42  Cf. Stolcke, Veronica: “Talking Culture. New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in 
Europe”. In: Current Anthropology. 36 (1995:1), 4.
43  “I Tænketankens første rapport blev tilslutningen til grundlæggende værdier og normer 
ikke fremhævet som et af de vigtigste mål for vellykket integration på linje med uddannel-
se, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse. De erfaringer og undersøgelser, der er kommet til si-
den 2001, synes imidlertid at vise, at værdier og normer skal tillægges større betydning 
[...] At udlændinge skal tilslutte sig grundlæggende værdier og normer indebærer som ud-
gangspunkt ikke, at udlændinge skal opgive deres oprindelige kultur, fx religion, 
påklædning eller madkultur. Dette kan dog være nødvendigt, hvis en fastholdelse af den 
oprindelige kultur strider mod værdier og normer i Danmark i et sådant omfang, at udlæn-
dinge ikke kan deltage på lige fod med danskere i arbejds- og samfundslivet i øvrigt.” Mi-
nisteriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration: Værdier og normer – blandt udlæn-
dinge og danskere. Tænketanken om udfordringer for integrationsindsatsen i Danmark. 
København 2007, 4; Cf. idem: Regeringens vision og strategier for bedre integration. Juni 
2003, kap. 4.2.3.
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In this new narrative, the culture, religion, values and norms of the individual immi-
grant end up as a threat to Danish welfare. The weight of the countermeasures is 
gradually shifted over the years. Initially, “diversity management” and local, “practical 
solutions which satisfy everyone” are mentioned.44 Later, as we shall see, a clearer 
allocation of roles and responsibilities is presented. 
Grand narratives of homogeneity and universal values 
Before the government narrative clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, it has been 
“beefed up” by articulating two more abstract narratives: A functionalist narrative fo-
cused on “cohesive force” points out cultural homogeneity as a prerequisite for wel-
fare. An exceptionalist narrative about Denmark as a pioneer nation describes Danish 
values as universally valid. Though the two narratives may at first seem at odds, they – 
as described by Mouritsen45– both reinforce the same cultural countermeasure: the 
spread of Danish values.46
Functionalism: Plurality as a threat to welfare 
The “functionalist” narrative hinges on the concept of “cohesive force”.47 Like the nar-





44  “håndtere mangfoldighed praktiske løsninger, som tilfredsstiller alle” Ibid.
45  Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 78ff.
46  Mouritsen analyses the two narratives under the labels “instrumental homogeneity” and “par-
ticular universalism” as part of a discussion of national and civic values as they are related in 
debates on Muslims. Hedetoft sketches elements of both narratives – focusing, however, pri-
marily on functionalism – in an analysis of Danish policy, media and public discourse on in-
tegration (Hedetoft, Ulf: “‘Cultural transformation’: how Denmark faces immigration”. In: O-
penDemocracy.net. 30  October 2003.th  http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-
migrationeurope/article_1563.jsp, 1  November 2006st , 3; Idem 2006, as footnote 8, 398, 401, 
407). Lægaard  discusses the particular universalism of Danish liberalism as a form of nationa-
lism (see Lægaard, Sune: “Liberal nationalism and the nationalisation of liberal values”. In: 
Nations and Nationalism 13 (2007:1), 37–55).
47  Peter Gundelach reminds me (author’s conversation with P. Gundelach on 25th May 2008) 
that the established sociological terminology has “social cohesion” for the Danish “sam-
menhængskraft”. I have elected to retain the literal translation “cohesive force” because of 
the connotations which the phrase carries in Danish: Firstly, “cohesive force” is something 
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this narrative presents the national economy (and the welfare goods it allows) as the 
threatened object. But this narrative does not explain only a competitive economy with 
a high employment rate: 
The government will suggest [...] specific […] steps with a view to strengthen our com-
petitive force and our cohesive force. Cohesive force; that is to secure a society that 
hangs together. A society in which there are no excessive social or economic divisions. 
[...] But cohesive force is also to secure a society that hangs together in terms of values. 
One of the strengths of Danish society is that we – despite differences in opinion on a 
series of specific questions – nevertheless build on a common foundation of certain fun-
damental values. Some of these values are challenged these days.48
Economic success for a nation comes from being competitive – and a decisive factor in 
Denmark’s ability to compete is the trust among people made possible by cultural ho-
mogeneity. The threat in this “functionalist” narrative is not individual unemployment 
but cultural differences. A cultural difference is not just any link in the causal chain; it 
is the source of the threat: 
A minority among the immigrants have become more religious – and [...] they have be-
come so in a way that may be of significance for their integration. We need to take this 




that is temporally and causally situated before cohesion; it is a force which effects cohe-
sion. Secondly, omitting the prefix “social” allows “cohesion” to articulate either “social”, 
“cultural”, or both; a specific ambivalence which is active in the narratives presented by 
the prime minister. This lack of specificity is different from the established sociological 
use of “social cohesion”, which in English denotes the “social cohesion” across cultural 
plurality – and which has allowed a twin concept of “cultural cohesion” to be mainly ap-
plied in organizational and management studies to denote the need for an organization not 
to be multicultural. The Danish “cohesive force” allows – as we shall see – both a threat 
from cultural plurality as such and a threat from lack of “social cohesion” across cultural 
plurality.
48  “[Regeringen vil foreslå ...] en række konkrete [...] skridt, som skal forstærke både vores kon-
kurrencekraft og vores sammenhængskraft. Sammenhængskraft, det er at sikre et samfund, der 
hænger sammen. Et samfund, hvor der ikke er for store sociale og økonomiske skel. [...] Men 
sammenhængskraft er også at sikre et samfund, der værdimæssigt hænger sammen. En af 
styrkerne i det danske samfund er, at vi trods forskellige holdninger til en række konkrete 
spørgsmål dog bygger på et fælles grundlag af visse fundamentale værdier. Nogle af disse 
værdier bliver udfordret i disse år.” Rasmussen, Anders Fogh in: “F18” (Concluding debate), 
15  June 2005th , PM’s intervention. http://stm.dk/_p_7495.html, 9  November 2009th .
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and jobs are not enough. If we want to keep the cohesive force in Danish society, every-
one needs to know and observe the fundamental rules of the game.49
In this way, the object threatened in the functionalist narrative is still welfare – but cul-
tural homogeneity is (qua a necessary link in the causal chain narrated) co-promoted 
as a valuable good. This gives the narrative an enhanced compatibility with purely cul-
turalist narratives.  
Exceptionalism: Their values as a threat to our (common) values 
The second grand narrative which produces the need for cultural integration is the “ex-
ceptionalist narrative” which describes how Denmark – by virtue of its history and 
culture – is uniquely disposed to act as an example to the world: The narrative equates 
a series of specifically Danish values and practices with universally good values and 
practices. In that sense, this second narrative seeks recourse to elements of Danish 
identity discourse constructing Denmark as a humanitarian example to the world. 
Mouritsen focuses his analysis on the possibility of Muslims’ citizenship on two argu-
ments adding to Danish exceptionalism.50 The first argument claims that the Lutheran 
version of Christianity is a precondition for separating politics and religion – and 
therefore a precondition for freedom.51 On the one hand, Christianity liberates politics 
from religion: “It is Christianity which constitutes the distinction [between politics and 
religion]. […] The preaching of Jesus makes it possible [for us to] discuss politics and 




49  “[E]t mindretal blandt indvandrerne er blevet mere religiøse, og det er på en måde, der kan 
have betydning for integrationen. Det skal vi tage alvorligt. [...] Hvorfor er det vigtigt for 
integration at tale om værdier? Fordi uddannelse og job ikke er nok. Hvis vi skal bevare 
sammenhængskraften i det danske samfund, skal alle kende og overholde de grundlæg-
gende spilleregler.” Hvilshøj, Rikke: “De siger ja til demokratiet”. In: Frederiksborg Amts 
Avis. 17  March 2007th , 3.
50  Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 79–83.
51  Berg-Sørensen, Anders: “Hinsides sekularisme og hvad så?” In: Religionsvidenskapeligt 
Tidsskrift. (2006:48), 59–72.
52  “Det er kristendommen, der sætter sondringen [mellem religion og politik]. [...] Jesu for-
kyndelse er med til at gøre det muligt [at vi] kan diskutere politik og være enige eller ue-
nige om politik uden at der går ’hellighed’ i sagen.” Fergo, Tove: “At skelne i sam-
menhængen”. In: Folkevirke. (2003:58), 3–5.
 NORDEUROPAforum 21 (2011:1) 60
Peace, welfare, culture 
hand, Christianity liberates people from salvation becoming a political project: “With-
out gospel, salvation becomes a political task. Political ideologies will reign freely 
over people’s souls.”53 If, the story goes, Christ had not already taken care of salva-
tion, an attractive – and dangerous – market would be open for political projects offer-
ing the prospect of salvation. 
The second argument, which Mouritsen presents, claims that democracy and equality 
in Denmark – by virtue of, for example, the folk high schools and the co-operative 
movement – have developed into a form of life.54 In addition to freedom, equality and 
democracy, the same argument may be identified in relation to other central concepts. 
An especially forceful narrative is constructed when the prime minister articulates the 
exceptionalist narrative with the functionalist: 
As a small, peaceful country – where the people is homogenous and where the borders 
of language and country nearly coincide – we have very special conditions for influen-
cing with our values. We have a deeply rooted democracy which is not just based on 
certain formal institutions and laws, but exists as a culture in the Danish population. 
One may introduce institutions and laws but it is of no use if there is not a very strong 
democratic culture deep in the population. [...] Conversation is an important part, we are 
very consensus-orientated, and we prefer to take the views of minorities into account.55
The effect of this link between functionalism and exceptionalism is triple: First, an 




53  “Uden evangelium bliver frelsen en politisk opgave. De politiske ideologier får frit spil 
over sjælene.” Hornbech, Birthe Rønn: Lige Venstre. København 2001, 168.
54  The two arguments are tied together by two prominent figures: N. F. S. Grundtvig og Hal 
Koch; by their substantial national and theological messages as well as the roles they are 
awarded in historical narratives (cf. Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 80f.).
55  “Som et lille fredeligt land, hvor folket er homogent, og lande og sproggrænser stort set 
følges ad, har vi helt særlige forudsætninger for at påvirke med vores værdier. Vi har et 
rodfæstet demokrati, der ikke kun er baseret på nogle formelle institutioner og lovgivning, 
men som er en kultur i den danske befolkning. Man kan sagtens indføre institutioner og 
love, men det nytter ikke noget, hvis der ikke er en meget stærk demokratisk kultur dybt i 
befolkningen. [...] Samtalen er en væsentlig del, vi er meget konsensusorienterede og kan 
bedst lide, at der bliver taget hensyn til mindretallene.” Ib, Helle: “Demokratiets pris”. In-
terview with Anders Fogh Rasmussen (PM, Venstre). In: Danmarksposten. (2003:4), 16–
19. Mouritsen (Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 13) concentrates his analysis on the two 
sentences “Vi har et rodfæstet demokrati [... ]” and “Samtalen er en væsentlig del [...]”.
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the boundaries of the state, the nation, the territory, the culture, the language and the 
religion coincide. This national self-image becomes, in the narrative promoted by the 
prime minister, a precondition for perfect freedom and democracy. Second, that perfec-
tion places on the shoulders of Denmark a special obligation to export our knowledge 
and values to the rest of the world: 
It is not a form of cultural imperialism in which our way of thinking is forced upon 
other peoples. But we do have an obligation to be on guard for freedom and human 
rights – and with that also to try to spread it to other parts of the world in which one 
does not have peace and freedom, and where the human rights are violated. To me there 
are certain entirely fundamental values – which one may call universal – which are not 
to be repressed.56
Third, the way others outside Denmark do not live up to the ideal national package 
deal constitutes a threat to the universal realization of universal values: 
But one needs to be patient when it concerns the Middle East since there are a lot of 
historical, cultural and religious barriers, and it might be so that one must for a conside-
rable span of time accept forms of democracy which do not in all regards fully live up to 
what we in Europe and the USA understand by this concept.57
In the early versions of the narrative, the threat against universal values is not acute. 
But, as we will return to, the threat appears more pertinent when linked directly to ter-




56  “Det er ikke en form for kulturimperialisme, hvor vores måde at tænke på skal påtvinges 
andre folkeslag. Men vi har en forpligtelse til at stå vagt om frihed og menneskerettighe-
der – og dermed også til at forsøge at udbrede det til andre dele af verden, hvor man ikke 
har fred og frihed, og hvor menneskerettighederne krænkes. Der er for mig nogle helt 
grundlæggende værdier, som man godt kan kalde universelle, og som ikke må undertryk-
kes.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen cited in Ib 2003, as footnote 55, 16.
57  “Men man bør være tålmodig, når det gælder Mellemøsten, for der er mange historiske, 
kulturelle og religiøse barrierer, og det kan også godt være, at man i en rum tid bliver nødt 
til at acceptere former for demokrati, der ikke i alle henseender lever fuldt op til, hvad vi i 
Europa og USA forstår ved begrebet.” Ibid.
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Freedom: an offer you can’t refuse 
Just as the combined functionalist and exceptionalist narrative legitimizes Danish “sys-
tems export”, the way in which Denmark embodies universal values legitimizes more 
heavy handed integration measures at home. Observers of the Danish welfare state 
have noted a recent change in the governmental techniques employed. Central to the 
function of the welfare state is now the induction of a “duty to be free” in its clients.58 
When this tendency meets the narratives of integration, it acquires the form of an obli-
gation to secure the drittwirkung of certain human rights, a role which the state takes 
upon itself: the rights of the individual are not – as human rights traditionally – threat-
ened by the state but by others in the civil society. More specifically, the state obliges 
itself to free Muslims from their culture – whether or not the individual realize that it is 
oppressed or not:  
We must help the individual immigrant woman to live an active life and we must chan-
ge the opinion of both men and women for the benefit of integration [...] It is related to 
another worrying tendency [...] that is, the coming generations. Turkish and Pakistani 
descendants have not gotten closer to Danish values and norms entirely as it could be 
expected taking into account that they have grown up in Denmark. This shows that there 
is still a need for a strong integrating effort. A huge challenge is still ahead of us ... We 
have long ago left the naïve belief of earlier times that everything will solve itself by it-
self.59
The government’s “think tank” allocates the responsibility so that, on the one hand, 
“the aliens take responsibility themselves for becoming a part of the Danish society 




58  Cf. Andersen, Niels Åkerstrøm: Borgerens kontraktliggørelse. København 2003, 114–123.
59  “Vi skal hjælpe den enkelte indvandrerkvinde til et aktivt liv og have ændret holdninger 
hos både mænd og kvinder til gavn for integrationen. [...] Det hænger også sammen med 
en anden bekymrende tendens [...] nemlig de kommende generationer. Tyrkiske og pa-
kistanske efterkommere har ikke nærmet sig danske værdier og normer helt som man kun-
ne vente, i forhold til at de er vokset op i Danmark. Det viser, at der fortsat er behov for en 
stærk integrationsindsats. Vi har stadig en stor udfordring foran os. [...] Vi har for længst 
forladt tidligere tiders naive tro om, at det hele løser sig af sig selv.” Hvilshøj 2007, as 
footnote 49.
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be integrated.”60 While on the other hand “we in Denmark – to a much greater degree 
than is the case today – draw the attention to and inform [oplyser] about Danish cul-
ture and way of living as well as about what norms and unwritten rules we have in 
Denmark”61. It does, however, not suffice to “draw attention” to our values; it is nec-
essary that “we in Denmark dare to make clear demands on the aliens that they must 
endorse fundamental values in the Danish society and that we lay down clear guide-
lines which they [...] must accept.”62 For the demands to reach the target group, the 
street level bureaucrats of the welfare state must be deployed: “Teachers, social work-
ers and other persons in contact with aliens on a daily basis should [...] in their daily 
work make direct and distinct demands on the aliens that they must endorse the fun-
damental values in Denmark.”63
While the initial integration narrative of the government was in 2001-2 that the welfare 
state with its clientification was threatening the (labour market) integration, six years 
later the conclusion is that the welfare state is the necessary countermeasure against a 
threat aimed at cultural homogeneity.64 The welfare state needs in one and the same 
move to avert the threat which Muslim culture poses to the freedom of each Muslim 




60  “at udlændinge selv tager et ansvar for at blive en del af det danske samfund, og at de ac-
cepterer, at de må ændre visse af oprindelseslandets værdier for at blive integrerede.” Mi-
nisteriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2007, as footnote 43, 25.
61  “vi i Danmark, i langt højere grad, end tilfældet er i dag, gør opmærksom på, hvilke 
grundlæggende værdier det danske samfund bygger på og oplyser om dansk kultur og le-
vevis, samt om, hvilke normer og uskrevne regler vi har i Danmark.” Ibid.
62  “at vi i Danmark tør stille klare krav til udlændinge om, at de skal tilslutte sig grundlæg-
gende værdier i det danske samfund, og at vi udstikker klare retningslinjer, som de [...] må 
acceptere” Ibid., 26.
63  “Pædagoger, lærere, sagsbehandlere og andre personer, der dagligt har kontakt med 
udlændinge, bør [...] i deres arbejde stille direkte og tydelige krav til udlændinge om, at de 
må tilslutte sig de grundlæggende værdier i Danmark.” Ibid., 27.
64  The Think Tank on Integration suggested in its report that clear instructions be produced for the 
employees in individual institutions and municipalities (cf. ibid., 27). The parliamentary debate 
on the report, however, concluded by calling for that it is discussed locally how one is to relate to 
how to handle conflicts of values (cf. Folketinget: “Resolution V65” on the fundamental values 
in the Danish society, passed by the government parties and the DPP. 3  May 2007.rd  
http://www.ft.dk/dokumenter/tingdok.aspx?/samling/20061/vedtagelse/V65/index.htm, 9  No-
vember 2009).
th
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freedom. Danish values are offered to the Muslims as a possibility – but by being a 
possibility of universal value, it is actually “an offer you can’t refuse”. Like the Godfa-
ther, the government cannot afford not to deliver on the offer, lest culturalism make 
more demands for assimilation. The employment of state power is needed to make mi-
grants live up to their potential by integrating them to universal values. This novel role 
for the state is stressed when the threat from the home grown terrorist must be averted 
too. 
The second threat to societal peace is home grown  
In the aftermath of the bombings of the London underground on July 7th, 2005, it was 
clear that the narrative on the threat of terrorism had changed. Whereas 9/11 prompted 
the need for Danish solidarity with the US, the narrative now presented as terrorism 
targeting a much closer “we”: “In Denmark terrorism is a threat to society, to the val-
ues it is built upon, and to the individual citizen.”65 At the same time, the narrative in-
cluded new means to avert the threat. The prime minister still stresses the need for 
every “necessary means for fighting terrorists and terror networks”66 abroad and at 
home. But after allocating the responsibility for the London bombings to “home 
grown” terrorists, another task is presented as urgent: “We have to prevent support and 
recruitment for terrorism [...] through an active integration policy at home [...]. We 
have to prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology of extremists.”67
The narratives of a threat to societal peace is in this way explicitly merged with the 




65  “I Danmark er terrorismen en trussel mod samfundet og de værdier, som det bygger på, og 
mod den enkelte borger.” Espersen, Lene: “L217”. Act on revision of the penal code, etc. 
31  March 2006st , written presentation, Minister for Justice (Konservative). 
http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/lovforslag/l217/fremsaettelsestale.htm, 1  September 2008. st
66  “nødvendige instrumenter til at bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk” Ibid., 15:20.
67  “Vi skal forebygge opbakning og rekruttering til terrorisme [...] gennem en aktiv integrations-
politik herhjemme [...] Vi skal forebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af ekstre-
misternes ideology.” Rasmussen, Anders Fogh in: “F7”. Parliament debate on the measures to 
counter terrorist activities in Denmark. 16  November  2005th ; Cf. Regeringen: En verden i fo-
randring. 2003, 13. http://www.um.dk/da/servicemenu/Publikationer/Udenrigspolitik/EnVer-
denIForandring.htm, 22  September 2008.nd
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nitely a part of the “broad spectrum”68 of measures employed to prevent terrorism. The 
home grown terrorist is, however, not an isolated threat. On the contrary, it is part of a 
broader threat which now – also – emanates from “home”. 
After the Cartoon crisis following the publications in the Jyllands-Posten daily twelve 
caricatures commissioned to “scorn and ridicule” the followers of the prophet Mo-
hammed, the narratives are tied together even more tightly to the distinction between 
foreign and domestic politics. Employed is the concept of “value struggle”.69 The 
prime minister begins his opening speech in 2006 in two ways: first, he ties 9/11 and 
the Cartoon crisis together as two episodes in a narrative of the fight against the same 
threat. Second, the freedom of expression – immediately resonating with the context of 
the Cartoon crisis to everyone in the audience – is posed as the decisive front in that 
struggle: 
On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked four airplanes in the USA. Thousands of 
innocent human beings were killed. And ever since, the world has not been the same. 
Over the last five years it has become clear that we are in the middle of a global value 
struggle. It is not a value struggle between cultures or religions. It is a value struggle 
between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, between democracy and 
dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral. 
We must actively support freedom and popular rule. We have to guard our rights and 
freedoms. Guard the right to choose how we want to live our life. Guard the freedom of 
expression – the most important of all rights and freedoms. It is important that we make 





68  “bredspektret” Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration: En fælles og tryg 
fremtid – forslag til en handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og ra-
dikalisering blandt unge, version posted for consultations. June 2008. 
http://borger.dk/forside/lovgivning/hoeringsportalen/faktaside?p_hoeringid=2146000244, 
22 September 2008.nd 
69  The concept of “value struggle” in the rhetoric of the prime minister has developed out of 
the concept of “cultural struggle”. As was the case with “cohesive force”, the PM initially 
employed the concept without any allusion to “Muslim relations”: the “cultural struggle” 
was, in his 1993 book, advocacy of a “minimal state”, envisioned as part of a struggle to 
free citizens from the state by eradicating their “slave mentality” in relation to the “social 
state” (Rasmussen, Anders Fogh: Fra socialstat til minimalstat. En liberal strategi. 
København 1993).
70  “Den 11. september 2001 kaprede 19 terrorister fire fly i USA. Tusindvis af uskyldige 
mennesker blev slået ihjel. Og siden har verden ikke været den samme. Gennem de sidste 
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The prime minister then employs the words “The global value struggle is taking place 
in Denmark too”71 as a segue to discussing problems relating to “extremists” and “fa-
natical fundamentalists” in Denmark. Finally, he links these problems to challenges to 
labour market integration by saying that: 
It is difficult to reach fanatical fundamentalists through better integration. But we may 
and must prevent the medieval thoughts and opinions of fundamentalism from having a 
fertile ground in Denmark. Therefore it is very crucial that the young Danes with an 
immigrant background get an education, get a job, get equal opportunity and a fair 
treatment in the Danish society.72
The new counterterrorism narrative produced, hence, claims that labour market inte-
gration should prevent fundamentalism. 
Bringing multiculturalism – and the state – back in73
Nevertheless the narrative presenting integration as a means to counter terrorism de-
parts from a distribution of roles in which “Danish Muslims and immigrants in Den-




fem år er det blevet klart, at vi står midt i en global værdikamp. Det er ikke en værdikamp 
mellem kulturer eller religioner. Det er en værdikamp mellem forstandig oplysning og 
fundamentalistisk formørkelse. Mellem demokrati og diktatur. Mellem frihed og tyranni. I 
den kamp kan man ikke være neutral. Vi må aktivt støtte frihed og folkestyre. Vi skal 
værne om vore frihedsrettigheder. Om retten til selv at vælge, hvordan vi vil leve vort liv. 
Om ytringsfriheden – den vigtigste af alle frihedsrettigheder. Det er vigtigt, at vi gør os 
klart, hvilke ekstremistiske kræfter, vi står overfor.” Idem: “R1”. PMs opening speech, 
3  October 2006. rd http://stm.dk/_p_7541.html, 16  June 2011.th
71  “Den globale værdikamp foregår også i Danmark.” Ibid.
72  “Det er svært at nå fanatiske fundamentalister gennem bedre integration. Men vi kan og 
skal hindre, at fundamentalismens middelalderlige tanker og holdninger får grobund i 
Danmark. Derfor er det meget afgørende, at de unge danskere med indvandrerbaggrund 
får uddannelse, får job, får lige muligheder og en fair behandling i det danske samfund.” 
Ibid.
73  The merging of integration policies with counter-terrorism policies – and the involved 
policies of dialogue sketched in the last subsections of this chapter – is the focus of a more 
detailed analysis in Gad 2010, as footnote 10, chapter 8.
74  “danske muslimer og indvandrere i Danmark er afgørende allierede i kampen mod terro-
risme” Rasmussen 2005, as footnote 67.
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Therefore it is decisive for the success of the narrative that these allies play the role 
which they have been awarded. The Ministry of Integration – in its 2008 draft “Action 
plan to prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people” – finds that 
culturalism may be a threat to the participation of the allies: 
[Our c]reation of suspicion of ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in the 
propaganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For this rea-
son too it is important that suspicion of being part of the problem is not placed on 
anyone able to contribute to the solution.75
The result is a narrative involving elements of both inclusion of difference and two-
way dialogue – combined to resemble the very multiculturalism which was initially 
declared to be a threat. Now, inclusion and dialogue is a necessary means to avert the 
threat from radicalization. The next episode of the narrative, however, involves a nec-
essary measure of control and surveillance. First of all, this episode focused on the 
“poorly integrated” already in focus as “criminal second generation immigrants”. Sec-
ondly, however, these measures are also focused on what appears to be “well-
integrated” Muslims: They must, on the one hand, be included and engaged in dia-
logue. At the same time, they are nevertheless potential terrorists precisely because 
they are Muslims. This task demands vigilance in the street level bureaucrats of the 
welfare state – but it also demands that they be aware of their limitations so that they 
may call in the necessary expertise to assist: “To judge whether it is a case of violent 
radicalization or just political or religious interest demands such a highly specialized 
knowledge that it will be impossible for the individual [crime-prevention] worker to 
distinguish.”76
The narrative, thus, continues as the government – to avert the culturally based threat 




75  “Mistænkeliggørelse af etniske eller religiøse grupper kan bruges aktivt i den propaganda, 
som vi ser fra dem, der er modstandere af et mangfoldigt demokratisk samfund. Også derfor er 
det vigtigt, at ingen, der kan bidrage til løsningen, mistænkeliggøres for at være en del af 
problemet.” Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2008, as footnote 68, 13.
76  “At vurdere, om der er tale om voldelig radikalisering eller blot politisk eller religiøs inte-
resse, kræver en så højt specialiseret viden, at det for den enkelte medarbejder vil være 
umuligt at skelne.” Nyidanmark. Newsletter of the Ministry for Integration, etc., special 
issue on the anti-radicalization action plan. 2008 (2), 11. 
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threat to Danish culture. However, as multiculturalism still poses a threat, it is neces-
sary to employ the very welfare state which was initially presented as a threat to labour 
market integration. The resulting narrative institutionalizes a set of procedures for sur-
veillance and control of the limit of acceptable cultural and religious difference – the 
limit of who may be included and who may be engaged in dialogue without endanger-
ing the peace. The conclusion must be that, even if the government does not explicitly 
point out Muslims as an existential threat, Muslims are nevertheless implicated in a 
security discourse as threatening.77 And if they are not, they might very easily impli-
cate themselves. 
Conclusion: Counter-narratives as security problems 
However, the centre-right government’s narratives on the presumptive threats from Mus-
lims to Danish society do not end here. A last step of the analysis must be to discuss in 
what meaningful ways the narrative may continue and what directions it may take in the 
future. Any continuation of a narrative depends on how the ones awarded a role in the nar-
rative partake in the continuation. Such a partaking has as its point of departure exactly 
that: the taking up of a part, a role presented by the narrative – even if this leads to a de-
parture from the role, to taking issues with the role, or to taking exception to the way the 
role is described.  
As the analysis is aimed at identifying security problems, the task of this conclusion is to 
identify limits to which kinds of continuations the narrative can handle without producing 
more security problems. An even more pertinent topic is to identify security dilemmas. 
For example, situations in which the official Danish narrative on what to do about (and to) 
Muslims produces perspectives of the future which – all, many, some, a few – Muslims 
insist that they can only meet with a “counter-securitization”. This is a situation where the 
answer to the existential threat posed by the official Danish narratives (according to this 
specific Muslim identity narrative) involves continuing the spiral by posing a threat to the 




77  A discourse which, notably, also spins itself around the government narrating it in the sense that 
it awards roles to the welfare state and to multiculturalism almost diametrically opposite the 
one pointed out for it by the government at the point of departure.
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of governmentality,78 points to two mechanisms which may be relevant to the Danish 
situation. The mechanisms may, however, here set in earlier than in Hage’s analysis, in-
asmuch as multiculturalist strategies are, when push comes to shove, a rather limited fea-
ture of the Danish narratives. 
This is because even the most far reaching multiculturalism is not a narrative of equal cul-
tures. To the contrary, it is a narrative on how to make sufficient room for the other culture 
to flourish in a way which does not make it feel threatened in areas that it holds to be criti-
cal for its identity. The precondition for this narrative is that the majority culture still sets a 
“neutral” frame.79 This is the reason why even the most far reaching multiculturalisms 
presents themselves to be threatened by “the seriously religious Muslim” – Hage’s label 
for those Muslims who insist that the space for Islam must in principle be unlimited.80 
This is the reason why there is no big difference between old school demands for assimi-
lation and “the new milder form of asserting the need for immigrants (meaning primarily 
Muslims) to adopt the “core values” of particular nations”81. 
This mechanism has quite clearly been at work in the difficulties which “seriously reli-
gious” Muslims have encountered when engaging in party politics: Even when declaring 
themselves willing to endorse a party platform without any substantial reservations, the 
theologically phrased discursive work they need to do excludes them from being eligi-
ble.82 It is not possible to be simultaneously 100 per cent Dane and 100 per cent Muslim. 
The official Danish narratives demand that one chooses or at least prioritizes between the 
two. Furthermore, Hage draws attention to differences in the way various types of nation-
alism perform exclusion: traditional, culturalist nationalism either does not welcome 
aliens at all – or openly awards them a subordinate role. Such “non-interpellation” or 




78  Hage, Ghassan: “Analysing Multiculturalism Today”. In: Tony Bennett and John Frow (eds.): 
The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis. London 2008, 488–508.
79  Ibid., 498.
80  Ibid., 505.
81  Ibid., 507.
82  Hervik, Peter: Mediernes muslimer – en antropologisk undersøgelse af mediernes dækning af 
religioner i Danmark. København 2002; Jørgensen, Signe Kjær: “‘Hvad er egentlig proble-
met?’ En analyse af diskursive barrierer for muslimske folketingskandidater i dagspressen”. In: 
Marianne Holm Pedersen and Mikkel Rytter (eds.): Islam og muslimer i Danmark efter 
11.9.2001. København (forthcoming).
 NORDEUROPAforum 21 (2011:1) 70
Peace, welfare, culture 
nity; of not belonging to it.83 Present day official nationalism, however, does actually of-
ten award what appears to be an equal role to the alien. It may be a “multiculturalist” role 
which appears immediately equal. Otherwise, it may be a role in a “process of integration” 
which places equality at the end of a process of adjustment. Here, however, a problem 
may arise as the alien happily accepts and takes up his or her role – only to be refused: 
“The role wasn’t meant like that – it wasn't meant to be played like that or by someone 
like you.” Perhaps one more demand was added to the list – “well-integrated”. This type 
of “mis-interpellation”, writes Hage, gives rise to a sense of being marginalized within a 
community, a sense of disappointment with the community one thought one belonged 
to.84 That mechanism obviously appears in a Danish context – not the least because the 
roles in the Danish integration narratives shift according to the threats in need of aversion. 
The threshold for “successful integration” is an incessantly moving target. The question is 
whether “successful integration” – in the terms of the narrative – is possible at all, when a 
Muslim background may produce a distinct need for vigilance on the part of the welfare 
state. Is it possible for a Muslim to escape the role of a potential threat? Hage, finally, de-
scribes how the two mechanisms may reinforce each other: When the “well-integrated” 
Muslim finds that his or her way of playing the role is questioned – the result may be “as-
similation or recognition fatigue”.85 In that situation, an identity as a “seriously religious 
Muslim” may appear as an attractive alternative.86
If this choice is made, Danish narratives of integration have produced a security problem 
for themselves: they have provoked an answer which in their own continuation may best 
be described as a threat. The threat, notably, is produced without the “seriously religious 
Muslim” engaging him or herself in terrorism or denouncing democracy. The specific way 
in which official Danish identity discourse constructs the Muslim may contribute to de-
creasing loyalty to Denmark and even to increasing the actual terror threat. However, an 
excluded Muslim does not need to take to such extreme measures to appear threatening: 




83  Hage 2008, as footnote 78, 503f.
84  Ibid., 503f.
85  Ibid., 507.
86  Ibid., 507f.
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threat to the narrative.87 You may begin your argument for democracy in Jesus, in Yah-
weh, or in the nature or dignity of man – and you may pledge loyalty to Denmark by sol-
emnly swearing with reference to each of the above – but not Mohammed, because a “se-
riously religious Muslim” is not to be trusted. The answer to that threat may be yet another 
round of demands to be “fully integrated” as well as the surveillance necessary to confirm 
the integration – which may instigate yet another round of dissociation. The way to break 
this destructive spiral involves attention to its existence, as “it is precisely when faced with 
authoritarian forms of requirements to assimilate that people create protected spaces whe-
re they can express and live their cultures outside the authoritarian gaze demanding con-
formity”88. The pains taken to formulate an invitation to dialogue when writing the 
counter-radicalization action plan89 may be interpreted to signal such an attention – even 
if the plan did not succeed in escaping the spiral. In the same way, one may find reason for 
optimism in the answer of the new prime minister when pressed to engage himself in the 
“value struggle”:  
Well, I would like those girls to take off their veil. But I would like them to do it themselves. 
Because if I should be the one doing it, two more would start wearing the veil in protest for e-
very one taking it off. That is my approach. And it is not because I do not see the challenge that 
I do not want to force them. I flatter myself that it is actually because I do see the challenge.90
A few months later, however, the government decided that since “the burqa and the niqab 
do not belong in Danish society [...] the government urges that existing rules and possibili-




87  Cf. Hervik 2002, as footnote 82; Jørgensen forthcoming, as footnote 82; and Gad 2010, as 
footnote 10, chapter 8.
88  Hage 2008, as footnote 78, 507.
89  Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2008, as footnote 68.
90  “Altså, jeg vil jo gerne have de dér piger til at tage tørklædet af. Men jeg vil gerne have dem til 
at gøre det selv. For hvis jeg gør det, vil der dagen efter være to mere, som tager tørklæder på i 
protest. Det er min indfaldsvinkel. Og det er ikke, fordi jeg ikke kan se udfordringen, at jeg ik-
ke vil tvinge dem. Jeg bilder mig ind, at jeg faktisk er, fordi jeg kan se udfordringen.” Krause-
Kjær, Niels: Lars Løkke. Viby 2009. [Interview with PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Venstre)].  
91  “Burqa og niqab hører ikke hjemme i det danske samfund [...] regeringen [opfordrer] kraf-
tigt til, at de eksisterende regler og muligheder for faktisk at begrænse brugen af burqa og 
niqab anvendes fuldt ud.” Regeringen: Burqa og niqab hører ikke hjemme i det danske 
samfund. Government position paper, posted 28  January 2010. th http://www.stm.dk/mul-
timedia/Regeringen.pdf, 19  April 2010.th
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